Just when I thought things were getting a little bit boring here, political normality at Cambridge (so, chaos) was restored last week during episode 1 million of Cambridge students versus right-wing apologists. Last week’s edition featuring Katie Hopkins was a classic case of the familiar story we all know and love: right-wing apologist offends students, students complain, right-wing apologist complains about students complaining. Oh, the irony of this occurring at a debate about the ‘right to offend ’ …thank you Cambridge Union for another justification of the 250 quid I splashed on a membership!

Hopkins’ tactic at the debate was to exercise the very right she was advocating for, even targeting specific students in the chamber. I put it to you, offended students of Cambridge, that this attitude is the winning formula in the free speech debate. “If you feel offence, that’s a you problem” says Hopkins. Right back at you, I say in reply.

Cambridge truly is the gift that keeps on giving, for my point can be perfectly exemplified by another notable clash at the University. The Cofnas versus Emmanuel saga continues, with the former ‘race realist’ fellow now suing the College for belief discrimination. I’ll spare you the details, but I’m sure you already get the gist of Cofnas’ contention – his controversial views, however offensive, ought not to be grounds for dismissal.

Now, here’s the thing: the argument for the right to offend is based on the idea that such a right is necessary for meaningful political thought and discourse. Sure, it may very well be. Yet a logical extension of this is that the right to react – the right to be offended – is equally essential. And, yes – that includes the right to sack someone if they say something offensive!

“Some academic insights aren’t just offensive – they’re bad"

Before I get into exactly why this is the case, there’s an incredibly interesting turn of the tables that shouldn’t go unmentioned. The conversation surrounding free speech has always equated those who treasure it dearly with the ‘tough guys’ who tell those weaklings who want to restrict it to just ‘get over it’. Cofnas, as someone seemingly offended by the fact that his employer exercised their right to be offended, is the ultimate counterexample to this picture.

Yeah, it sucks that you lost your job over a belief that you hold. But what are you going to do about it, huh? Complain? Sue? Throw a fit? Toughen up, softie (oh wait, that’s supposed to be your line … my bad – I was just channeling my inner Hopkins!)

So the ‘tough guy’ free speech absolutist isn’t so tough if you react with tangible consequences to their words. Yet, what makes us justified to do this in the first place?

As a Philosophy student, I can’t (nor do I want to) speak on behalf of my department, but I can offer my two cents – so here they come. Cofnas’ case for literal white supremacy is not just offensive, it’s bad philosophy. If I wrote an essay arguing for a greater embrace of the biological differences between genders such that they are actualised into social standings, I don’t think my supervisors would be very impressed. Sure, they’d probably be offended. But I think they’d also just be … again, unimpressed.

A lot of where we go wrong here boils down to an utterly infuriating tendency within academia to completely ‘subjectivise’ the humanities. The non-existence of an objective right or wrong in a particular field is no reason to trivialise all standards within it. Yes, there are bad arguments, and bad papers, and bad interpretations. If only I were an undergraduate in the days of Wittgenstein so that he could exemplify this fact by bullying me for my (probably terrible) insights on his Tractatus.

Some academic insights aren’t just offensive – they’re bad. And, yes, it may be harsh that certain people at the top get to decide what counts as ‘bad philosophy’, but that’s just how it is (once again – suck it up). If you want to make your case that badly, go somewhere else (may I suggest *xford?)

“If we actually want to protect freedom of expression, we must let the offended react just as much as the offenders provoke”

To be clear, I’m not advocating for silencing those we disagree with (I have adamantly written against this in the past). I’m simply making the point that any institution’s standards (even if subjective) are not subservient to freedom of speech. Your right to ‘say anything’ is not a meaningful counter to your employer telling you that you aren’t working up to par – especially when your work literally consists of saying insightful things on behalf of your employer.

Sacking, at least in this case, is not the same as silencing. It’s not a declaration that you’re not allowed to say whatever it is that you want to say. It is the subtly yet vastly different declaration that you can’t say what you want to say here. If Cofnas was a farmer rather than a philosopher, then perhaps losing his job would be a case of belief discrimination. But his job is (or, sorry, was) entirely predicated on upholding a certain quality of philosophical belief, so why would that not be scrutinised?

The main argument that Cofnas and his supporters make is that the academic sphere should allow for more controversial philosophy. And you know what, fine. Write whatever you want. In that sense, consider me a free speech absolutist. What is honestly laughable, though, is the assumption (no, sorry, the expectation!) that writing what you want (again, especially in an academic sphere) will come without consequence.

“But there should be no consequences for expressing my beliefs” they all say in unison. Yet, if this is the case, what is there to make of the freedom of the offended? How can the University express their own freedom?

Truly, if we actually want to protect freedom of expression, we must let the offended react just as much as the offenders provoke. And, in doing so, the reactors can be as offensive as they wish.