That Scotland constitutes a nation in its own right is not up for dispute: the Scottish nation is a political fact. There can be no doubt that Scotland, as separate from the rest of Britain, thinks of itself as having a distinct culture and history – even a distinct spirit. Nobody who puts any value on democracy can dismiss Scottish nationalism as unimportant. No matter how much it cuts against ‘objective history’, Scottish nationalism has to be taken seriously by those interested in participatory politics.

The fact that Scotland is a nation has implications for how Scotland ought to be run – or rather, who it ought to be run by. Nationalism is founded on the belief that a people should be self-determining, with as great a role as possible in its own politics.

Yet despite all of this being the case, it is no longer possible (if it was ever possible in the first place) for a nation to become self-determining. The global political and economic system is too complex and global interdependence too embedded in the operation of the state for any simplistic conception of ‘self-determination’ to be realised.

These two truths present nationalists and those who wish to take nationalism seriously with a dilemma: how to allow (indeed, encourage and support) the expression of a nation’s desire for control over its own affairs when it is faced with such a powerful global market, such well-established global norms of state policy, and such binding global treaty networks. Not everybody likes the European Union (EU), never mind the euro. But its regional, multilateral policies have successfully combated acid rain problem and provided the possibility of a sustainable fishing industry (which is yet to emerge). The European single market has allowed participating countries to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in regulatory and employment frameworks. Burdens of responsibility have successfully shifted: now, rather than underfunded government bodies having to prove that new products are harmful to the environment, chemical manufacturers are obliged to prove that they are not.

Few would deny that these are examples of the good which being part of a political union can bring. For those that don’t, it is actually an important element of the Scottish National Party’s (SNP’s) agenda that an independent Scotland would remain in the EU. Of course, this doesn’t directly deal with Scotland’s membership in the UK. The arguments for and against that affiliation have been rehearsed many times before, and it’s not worth getting into the nitty-gritty of them here. What is clear though is that there are at least some advantages to Scotland’s being part of Britain. To name one example: a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and if international influence doesn’t float your Trident submarine, a good instance of domestic benefit is a secure membership of the EU.

It is absolutely not obvious that a Scotland which seceded unconditionally from the UK would be able to retain the benefits it wanted to. Its membership of the EU would be cast into doubt as Scotland would have to re-apply and commit to the principle of the euro (as José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, along with other EU insiders have said). Scotland’s international influence would wane. And this is not just a matter of pride: trade deals, and the terms on which they are made, matter. Monetary issues could very seriously jeopardise the plausibility of Scotland’s political independence: in the unlikely event that it keeps the pound (given that it wants to join the EU), what control would it have over its own monetary policy?

It is hard to see why Scotland would put itself through the arduous process of unambiguous political secession, given that there is no hope for total and unmitigated national sovereignty. Separatism is a misappropriation of nationalism which would be better expressed by a moderate but deadly serious renegotiation of the terms of the Union. Perhaps a strong turnout in favour of secession would provide the political impetus for Scottish leaders (and the scare-factor for those in Westminster to give continued devolution the attention that it deserves).

But uncompromising separatism no longer makes sense as an expression of nationalism. There does not seem to be a categorical distinction between the EU and the UK: both are political unions, both have advantages and disadvantages. What nationalism requires of Scottish politicians with regard to both of these affiliations is careful negotiation and consideration of pros and cons. If a referendum on total political severance is required to get these processes going (or indeed to keep them going), then so be it. But if the separatists win, the bairn will be out with the bathwater.

This article was originally published in the International Political Forum.