The unrest sweeping Egypt represents the broadest challenge to the authority of the Egyptian military since the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Although headlines focus on Cairo, protests continue in a host of other locations, and the grievances are broadly the same. In the months since the Revolution, the hated security services have remained powerful, the space for freedom of speech has rapidly shrunk, and few have seen noticeable improvements in their day-to-day economic circumstances.

The January revolution may have toppled a dictator, but it has not dislodged the roots of an authority that runs far deeper. The history of modern Egypt is intimately connected to the strength of the military, an institution that has outlasted three presidents. Today, the acting president is Field Marshall Tantawi, chairman of the nation’s military council (SCAF). His response to the latest wave of unrest has been to announce the formation of a ‘government of national salvation’ and a promise to cede power in June 2012. The ongoing unrest has raised serious doubts over the wisdom of proceeding with planned elections next week. Although many had foreseen an upsurge in violence as polling day drew closer, predictions had centred on the role of former ruling-party members. Few imagined that the provocation, when it came, would emanate from the security services themselves, or that it would happen in such a crude manner.

The question of whether to postpone elections is not an easy one to answer. When the decision is taken, it must happen for the right reasons and there is one motivation that must not be allowed to underpin such a choice: fear of the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite rumours of a tacit alliance between the military and the Brotherhood, it seems clear that the former is wary of the latter. If the SCAF now use the ongoing unrest as a pretext for postponing elections and therefore denying the Islamists victory at the ballot box, then this tactic is no better than the electoral manipulations of the Mubarak era.

Concerns over security represent a more legitimate justification for postponement. Under the current circumstances the state is unable to guarantee voter safety. Can those giving orders to shoot live rounds at protesters really be expected to transform into the benevolent guardians of election security in the space of a week? In addition, the victors of any poll conducted next week may struggle to present themselves as legitimate representatives of the people. A number of parties have withdrawn from the election in protest at the week’s events. As a result, the electoral field is suddenly skewed in favour of those that have chosen to remain in the running, a development that will have repercussions for how the eventual result is perceived.

If elections are delayed, the interim government must prioritise three related areas of reform in order to ensure that the eventual vote is as fair as possible.

Firstly, they must reassess the proposed electoral system. Current plans are absurdly complicated and there has been little effort to explain how procedure will work. This oversight will affect turnout and the validity of thousands of polling cards. The new cabinet should reassess current plans, adopt a single method of voting and communicate this clearly to the Egyptian public.

The second priority should be media reform. State-run networks have played an important role in discrediting opposition groups and framing challenges to military authority as an attack on the nation. The reach of government TV channels has allowed the state to maintain firm control of how events are reported, often presenting stories that directly contradict eyewitness testimonies.

Finally, the new cabinet must develop a coherent narrative as to why it is crucial that they take charge, offering a clear explanation as to why the polls were delayed. Only once these steps have been taken can Egyptians hope for the new political dawn that they deserve.

Louisa Loveluck blogs @ http://leloveluck.wordpress.com/